Computer Programs in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the 1991 EC Software Directive by Huet, Jerome & Ginsburg, Jane C.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
1992 
Computer Programs in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the 
1991 EC Software Directive 
Jerome Huet 
Jane C. Ginsburg 
Columbia Law School, jane.ginsburg@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Transnational Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jerome Huet & Jane C. Ginsburg, Computer Programs in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the 1991 EC 
Software Directive, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 327 (1992). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2142 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Computer Programs in Europe:
A Comparative Analysis of the
1991 EC Software Directive
J1ROME HUET* AND JANE C. GINSBURG"
INTRODUCTION
Long awaited-if not feared-in the computer industry, where
its elaboration had evoked heated debate, the European Council
Directive of May 14, 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs (the "Directive" or "Software Directive")1 has imposed
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This article is based in part on J6r8me Huet, L'Europe des logiciels: le principe
de la protection par le droit d'auteur (directive communautaire du 14 mai 1991), 1992
Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique [D.S. Chron.] 221. The authors wish to thank Peter J.W.
Sherwin, Columbia Law School, J.D. 1992, for his help in translating footnotes drawn from
the French publication.
1. Council Directive 91/250 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Directive]. On the
different versions of the Directive, see Thomas Dreier, The Council Directive of May 14,
1991, on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, [1991] 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
319. The first important stage of the Directive was the Commission's initial text of January
5, 1989. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1989 O.J. (C 91) 13 [hereinafter Directive Draft I]. The Commission published
an Explanatory Memorandum to Directive Draft L 1989 OJ. (C 91) 4 [hereinafter
Explanatory Memorandum]. The intermediate stage was the Commission's modified
proposal of October 18, 1990. Commission Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1990 O.J. (C 320) 22 [hereinafter Directive
Draft I]. On December 13, 1990 the Council adopted this intermediate version without
many changes. This version of the text became the final version of the Directive of May 14,
1991.
On the legislative history of the Directive, see, e.g., Alan K. Palmer & Thomas C.
Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Software: New Law Governing
Software Development, 2 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 65, 67-78 (1992); Mindy J.
Weichselbaum, Note, The EEC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and
U.S. Copyright Law: Should Copyright Law Permit Reverse Engineering of Computer
Programs?, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1027, 1043-50 (1991); Andr6 Lucas, Copyright in the
European Community: The Green Paper and the Proposal for a Directive Concerning Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145 (1991); Anthony R.G.
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common principles of copyright protection on the twelve Member
States of the European Community (the "EC", the "Community"). As
it declares in its preamble, the Directive responds to the need to
ensure the proper functioning of a single market2 and, to that end, to
Nolan, Brave New World? Copyright Protection of Computer Programs in Germany and
France in Light of the European Community Software Directive, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 121 (1991); Linda G. Morrison, Note, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs: Does It Leave Room for Reverse Engineering Beyond the Need for
Interoperability? 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1992); Joseph W. Haaf, Note, The EC
Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs: Decompilation and Security for
Confidential Programming Techniques, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 401 (1992).
For additional commentary about the Directive and its legislative history see, e.g.,
BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J. HART, LEGAL PROTECTON OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN
EUROPE: A GUIDE TO THE EC DIRECrlVE (1991); Daniel J. Connors, Jr. & Antje Westphal,
The European Community Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs: A
Comparison Between European and U.S. Copyright Law, COMM. & L. Mar. 1992, at 25;
Jean-Frangois Verstrynge, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights within the New Pan-
European Framework- The Case of Computer Software, 92/2 REVUE DE DROIT DE
L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES TtLtcOMS [D.I.T.] 6 (1992) (The author is particularly well
informed about the Community text, having worked extensively on its final revision. While
the author comments on the Directive as it existed at the time of the adoption of the common
position by the Counsel in December 1991, there have not been any significant changes
since.); Dreier, supra; Thomas Dreier & Mickael Lehmann, The Legal Protection of
Computer Programs: Certain Aspects of the Proposal for an (EC) Council Directive,
COMPUTER L. & PRAc., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 92; Chris Reed, Reverse Engineering Computer
Programs Without Infringing Copyright, [1991] 2 EUR. INTEL. PROP. REV. 47; Guy P.V.
Vandenberghe, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs: An Unsatisfactory Proposal
for a Directive, [1989] 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 409; Michel Vivant, Le programme
d'ordinateur au Pays des Muses, Observations sur la directive du 14 mai 1991, 1990 La
Semaine Juridique (Juris-Classeur P~iodique) dition Entreprise, Chronique 94; CLAUDE
COLOMBET, PRomhr LItRAiR ET ARTISTIQUE No. 94 (6th ed. 1992).
2. This is the classic justification for harmonization measures adopted within the EC,
formerly on the basis of Article 100 of the original Treaty of Rome, and now on the basis
of Article 100a of the amended Treaty of Rome. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] arts. 100-100a (as amended 1987). Article 100a sets
forth the principle of harmonizing the Member States' laws to the full extent required to
achieve the "internal" market.
Adopted after the Single European Act of 1986, the Directive was based upon
Article 100a, which only requires a "qualified majority" to propose a directive. This,
however, did not hamper the Council from reaching unanimity in voting on this text. For
the basis of the justification that the Directive is necessary to assure the proper functioning
of the common market, see the Directive's preamble: "certain differences in the legal
protection of computer programs offered by the laws of the Member States have direct and
negative effects on the functioning of the common market .... ." Directive, supra note 1,
pmbl., para. 4. The same justification was advanced in connection with the Council
Directive of July 25, 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administra-
tive Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products: "existing
divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the common
market.... ." Council Directive 85/374, 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29. This directive was adopted
on the basis of Article 100, which requires the Council to act "unanimously." EEC TREATY,
art. 100 (as in effect in 1985).
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eliminate man), of the current differences among the Member States'
legal systems.
In the domain of European copyright law, the Software Directive
is a trend-setting text. This, the Community's first directive concern-
ing copyright law,4 was enacted more than thirty years following the
adoption of the Treaty of Rome.5 The treaty mentions copyright
only in Article 36, which simply affirms that the free circulation of
goods in the Community must respect intellectual property rights.6
The Directive was elaborated in the wake of the White Paper of 1985
on the internal market,7 which in turn presaged the adoption of the
Single European Act of 1986,8 and followed the Green Paper of 1988
on "Copyright and the Challenge of Technology."9 The White Paper
mentioned intellectual property rights as objects of harmonization,
3. Regarding these differences, see Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 7:
[S]ome Community Countries [lacked] any specific reference to computer
programs as protected works under national copyright law ....
Furthermore, even where Member States had express copyright
legislation protecting computer programs, that protection was not the same in
scope from one state to the next. The term of protection varied between 25
and 70 years [and] the level of originality required to attract protection at all
to a computer program varied dramatically between Member States.
4. However, this is the second directive concerning intellectual property in general; the
first was the Council Directive 87/54 of 16 December 1986 on the Legal Protection of
Topographies of Semiconductor Products, 1987 OJ. (L 24) 36.
5. See supra note 2.
6. In the 1970s there was some concern that the Community might play too great a
role in the cultural domain (and thereby exceed its primarily economic role) if it were to
become involved in the area of copyright. See Andr6 Frangon, Copyright and the Treaty of
Rome Instituting the European Community, 100 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 128, 140 (1979); Commission Communication to the Council, Sent on
22 November 1977, on Community Action in the Cultural Sector, in BULLETIN OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrmS 12-17 (Supp. 6177 1977); ADOLF DfiTz, COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNIES, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Nos. 650-68
(1978) (envisioning harmonization of legislation); COLOMBET, supra note 1, No. 494. During
the same period, the European Court of Justice clarified that "industrial and commercial
property," within the meaning of Article 36 of the EEC TREATY, includes literary and artistic
property. See, e.g., Case 62/79, Coditel v. Cin6 Vog Films, 1980 E.C.R. 881, 894, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8662 (1980). See COLOMBET, supra
note 1, No. 495.
7. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85)310 final [hereinafter White Paper].
8. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1.
9. Communication from the Commission, Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge
of Technology-Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final
[hereinafter Green Paper]. Concerning this document, see Andr6 Frangon, Thoughts on the
Green Paper, 139 R.I.D.A. 128 (1989); Jdr6me Huet, Le livre vert sur le droit d'auteur, 88/3
D.I.T. 74 (1988).
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especially with respect to new technologies,1 ° and the Green Paper
constituted the first true program for Community action in the area
of intellectual property. The historical contrast between the EC's
approach to copyright and that of the United States is striking. In the
United States, the Constitution declared from the beginning federal
competence over copyright law (and patent law), a competence which
led to uniformity of law among the fifty States. The current EC
effort shows that, starting from a diametrically opposed position,
convergence can nonetheless occur. Henceforth, in Europe, Commu-
nity institutions will take charge of at least some intellectual property
issues, preempting or overriding Member State regulation in the field.
There is another convergence occurring, this one in the broader
international arena. The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) has formed a Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol
to the Berne Convention that would include, among other subjects,
protection of computer software.1  The Berne Convention12 is the
oldest multilateral copyright treaty; ninety countries are signatories to
it.13  The Berne treaty imposes certain supranational norms of
protection, including specification of the kinds of works and rights
that signatory states must protect. The terms by which the proposed
Protocol would govern computer programs are in fact very close to
those of the EC Directive.1
4
The motivation for the Directive is not limited to the goal of
achieving European, or even international, harmonization. It is
apparent that concerns about Community-wide economic competi-
10. White Paper, supra note 7, no. 149.
11. The Committee's First Session was held in Geneva, November 4-8, 1991. A
Memorandum summarizing the First Session was prepared by the International Bureau of
WIPO and reprinted in Normative Activities of WIPO in the Field of Copyright, COPYRIGHT,
Feb. 1992, at 30 [hereinafter 1 WIPO Proposed Protocol to Berne]. A memorandum
summarizing the Committee's Second Session, held in Geneva, February 10-17, 1992, was
prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO and reprinted in Normative Activities of WIPO
in the Field of Copyright, COPYRIGHT, Mar. 1992, at 66 [hereinafter 2 WIPO Proposed
Protocol to Berne]. The Report adopted by the Committee was reprinted in Normative
Activities of WIPO in the Field of Copyright, COPYRIGHT, Apr. 1992, at 93 [hereinafter 3
WIPO Proposed Protocol to Berne].
12. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended in
1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
13. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary andArtistic Works, COPYRIGHT,
Jan. 1992, at 6-8 (number of Berne Convention adherents as of January 1, 1992).
14. See, e.g., 1 WIPO Proposed Protocol to Berne, supra note 11, at 32-35 (Computer
programs should be included under the Berne Convention definition of "literary work";
reproduction of computer programs should be allowed in certain circumstances where the
copying becomes "indispensable for using the computer program.").
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tiveness underlie the text as well.15  EC authorities consider the
adoption of the Directive a means of stimulating creation of computer
programs, especially by smaller and mid-sized enterprises, through
ensuring an adequate level of protection. 6 One of the Directive's
guiding aims is to afford protection that is at once uniform and
sufficient.
But protection should not be excessive. There is another ideal
implicit in the Directive: preservation of the best conditions for
competition in the domain of information and communication
technologies. Unlimited protection for copyright owners risks
undermining this goal. The extreme protection that some interests 7
had sought would have gone so far as to allow the creator of a
computer program to forbid third parties access to the basic ideas and
information contained within the program. The desire to avoid this
result is evident in the Directive's sections permitting certain acts of
decompilation-the translation of a program's object code into an
intelligible version, called source code, that the user may examine in
detail. One sees this concern in the final statements of the
15. See Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 3 ("[C]omputer programs are playing an
increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and computer program technology
can accordingly be considered as being of fundamental importance for the Community's
industrial development ....").
16. On the one hand, the object is to ensure "an adequate level of protection... in the
laws of all Member States" and, on the other hand, to eliminate "any difference [in
protection] which could affect the functioning of the common market... ." Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 1, pt. 1, No. 1.4. The Commission emphasized that such a legal
environment "is essential ... if research and investment in computer technology are to
continue at a sufficient level to allow the Community to keep pace with other industrialized
countries. In particular, as regards small and medium sized enterprises it is important that
their ability to create and market innovative software is not significantly reduced by
unauthorized reproductions of their products." I., pt. 1, No. 1.3.
17. See Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the pressure applied on Parliament
by the software industry about protection of interfaces); Dreier, supra note 1, at 319 n. 4
(recalling that the industry was divided into two groups: on the side urging the highest level
of copyright protection was Software Action Group for Europe (SAGE), a group that
included Apple, Digital, IBM, Philips, and Siemens; on the other side was the European
Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS), a group that included Amstrad, Bull, Fujitsu,
Olivetti, and NCR); Palmer & Vinje, supra note 1, at 70-78; Weichselbaum, supra note 1,
at 1045-50.
18. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs, XXTH REPORT ON COMPErI-
TION POLICY pt. 2, ch. I, § 4(g) (1991) (seeking a balance, in considering the question of
software decompilation, between protection for the software's creator, on the one hand, and
"safeguarding . . . an economic environment that could encourage competition and
innovation," on the other). See also discussion infra part H.B.2; Weichselbaum, supra note
1, at 1037.
The term "decompilation" (in both the French and English versions) is the one
chosen by the Directive, where it is presented as the act of bringing about a "translation of
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preamble as well; they declare that, with respect to the interopera-
bility of computer programs, the Directive's provisions are "without
prejudice to the application of the competition rules under Articles 85
and 86" of the Treaty of Rome, and that protection must not be
contrary to the "specific requirements of Community law already
enacted with respect to the publication of interfaces in the telecom-
munications sector or Council decisions relating to standardization in
the field of information technology and telecommunication."' 9
These considerations are fundamental in today's world of data
processing technology, which is of necessity intercommunicative, yet
which continues to evolve largely outside any official set of stan-
dards.
In this respect, however, it is not clear that EC authorities have
succeeded-following the extraordinary industry pressure brought to
bear on the drafting of the Directive-in arriving at an entirely
satisfactory result. One criticism to which the Directive is vulnerable
is that it has created a hybrid form of protection, half copyright and
half trade secret. Commercialized software is fully protected against
infringement, like any other work of authorship. Yet, at the same
time, it retains some aspects of non-divulged know-how. The
Directive does not permit all forms of analysis, study, or reverse
engineering of the program. Rather, the Directive includes a variety
of restrictions on decompiling computer programs. These restrictions
result to some extent in protecting software like a trade secret against
third party investigation.
This Article will address the Directive's articulation of the rights
of both software copyright holders and of software users. In Part I
we review the Directive's prerequisites to copyright in computer
programs, its designation of copyright owners, and the rights it
confers. In Part II we consider the rights of software users. We
address user rights from which the software copyright owner may
derogate by contract, as well as mandatory user rights, in particular
the right to decompile a protected program for the purpose of creating
a program that may operate in tandem with or in lieu of the protected
program. Throughout this Article, we compare software copyright
protection under the Directive with copyright protection for computer
programs as it has evolved in the United States.
[the] form" of the program's code. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.1. This term is narrower
than that of "reverse engineering," which refers more generally to many types of operations
analyzing software carried out by working back from the program's object code but without
necessarily doing a translation into source code. See also discussion infra part I.B.2.
19. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., paras. 27, 28.
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I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The 1991 EC Directive confirms that the protection of computer
programs will be guaranteed principally by the rules of copyright law,
even though Article 9.1 indicates that other laws, such as those in the
areas of patent, trade secrets or contracts, may furnish complementary
protection.2' The Member States, who must implement the Direc-
tive's rules by January 1, 1993, are obliged under Article 7 to
undertake "special measures of protection" against the commercializa-
tion of infringing programs, for example, affording copyright owners
the remedy of seizure. Article 8.1 of the Directive incorporates the
classic copyright rule of duration of protection-the life of the author
plus fifty years,21 or fifty years after commercial distribution of the
program to the public in the case of a juridical person.2 Article 9.2
provides that these rules apply even to programs created before
January 1, 1993. (However, no claim for infringement may be
brought against acts occurring before the implementation of the
Directive by national laws.') Thus, the author or copyright owner
of a program-the latter often in practice a corporation, be it a
hardware manufacturer or an software service provider-fully enjoys
well-established intellectual property rights.
It is not necessary to reflect at length either on the principle of
applying copyright law to the protection of computer programs, or on
the Directive's express classification of computer programs as
20. Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.1. The text also mentions unfair competition and
trademarks; while the former is justified, the latter is less so, for such distinctive symbols
protect an activity and not a creation in and of itself. As for the idea of trade secrets, it is
similar to the idea of know-how, which is protected in EC countries under such tort-law
doctrines as fraudulent conversion and liability for breach of confidence. See PINNER'S
WORLD UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA No. 74 (Heinz L. David ed., 1979).
21. Article 8.2 allows those States that already do apply a longer period of duration to
continue to do so up until Community harmonization of the duration period for protection
of works. A harmonization of copyright terms to life-plus-70 may be on the horizon. See
Thomas Dreier & Silke von Lewinski, The European Commission's Activities in the Field
of Copyright, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 96, 115-16 (1991).
22. This provision should be interpreted in two different manners depending on whether
it concerns mass-produced application programs or custom-made programs. For the former,
the program has been made publicly available when it is commercially distributed to the
public (comparable to publication of a literary work). For the latter, the "making available"
should be deemed to occur on the date of delivery of the completed program, for these
programs are generally not made public in the strict sense of the term but are instead
delivered by the producer-supplier according to the contract commissioning the creation of
the program.
23. Moreover, the text does not affect contracts concluded and rights acquired before
January 1, 1993. Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.2.
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"literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention."' The
resort to copyright law is a strategy that the Directive holds in
common with many domestic copyright laws, notably those of France
and the United States.25 Unanimity in positive law (if not in
academic commentary)26 already exists as to the above issues. The
legislative history of the Directive nonetheless demonstrates a concern
to eliminate all ambiguity and to protect software programs as literary
works, and not as merely analogous to literary works. The drafters
emphasize that software programs, like other literary works, express
ideas in determinate language.27 More fundamentally, the Commis-
sion determined for two reasons that copyright was well-adapted to
software: first, software programs are exploited by means of copies,
and the right of reproduction is an essential right under copyright; and
second, copyright protects expression without also privatizing the
underlying ideas and concepts expressed. Thus, the Commission
concluded:
Copyright offers a balanced solution between inadequate
and excessive protection. Its flexibility is sufficient to
permit a compromise between the divergent interests of
producers and distributors on the one hand, and computer
program users on the other. This form of intellectual
property protection has the principal advantage of covering
only the individual expression of the work, and thus
leaving the latitude desired by other authors to create
24. Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.1.
25. See, e.g., Law of July 3, 1985, Title V ("On Software"), recodified July 1, 1992 in
the new CODE DE LA PROPRimt tINTELLcrULLE [C. PRop. IN'rELL.] arts. 111-5, 113-9, 121-
7, 122-6, 123-5, 131-4, 332-4; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of "computer program");
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) (limitations on exclusive rights in a computer program). Germany,
Spain and the United Kingdom have also applied copyright law to the protection of computer
programs. See 1985 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 1273, art. 2(1) (F.R.G.) (programs for data
processing); Boletin Oficial del Estado (Official Gazette) [B.O.E.], No. 27, Nov. 17, 1987,
art. 10(1) (Spain) (intellectual property includes computer programs); Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act of 1988, ch. 48, No. 3(1) (U.K.) ("literary work" includes computer programs).
26. For criticism of copyright protection of computer programs, see, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE LJ. 663; Bernard Edelman, Commentaire
de la loi no. 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits d'auteur et aux droits voisine
(suite), 1987 AcruAuit LtGISLATIvE DALLoZ 1 (objecting to 1985 French law including
software in copyright).
27. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, pt. 2, art. 1.2; Verstrynge, supra note
1, at 7-8; Cf Jdr8me Huet & Hubert Maisl, Droit de l'informatique, 1985 Recueil Dalloz-
Sirey, Informations Rapides 39 (noting that a computer program, like a musical composition,
is no less a work of language simply because reading that language requires technical or
specialized knowledge).
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similar programs..., so long as they refrain from copy-
ing.
28
As for the reference to the Berne Convention, the Directive may
be attempting to force the treaty interpreter's hand, since the Conven-
tion's text does not in fact include computer programs within its
extensive illustrative list of literary works.29 On the other hand, it
is generally admitted that new kinds of works may be included within
30the scope of the definition. In any event, by adopting the double
characterization of copyright and literary works, the Directive
achieves two results whose import transcends the boundaries of the
Community: first, it places software within the rules set forth in the
Berne Convention concerning the copyright protection of literary
works; and second, with respect to international relations, it requires
application of the rule of national treatment to works of foreign Berne
Union programmers. 31 One might recall as well that, by application
of the rules of the Berne Convention, copyright protection of
computer programs in the EC may not be subject to any formalities,
such as the requirement of affixation of notice of copyright-a
formality in force in the U.S. before its adherence to the Berne
Convention.32 EC copyright protection of computer programs thus
appears well-delineated and easy to obtain. We will now examine the
conditions under which copyright protection will in fact be recog-
nized, and will specify more precisely who are the copyright owners,
and what are their rights.
A. Subject Matter of Protection: The Computer Program (Articles
1.1, 1.2)
The Directive covers all modes of computer programs: opera-
tions software (such as DOS), addressed to the functioning of the
28. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, pt. 1, Nos. 3-7. On the other hand,
protection by patent is of greater scope, for it covers everything up to certain principal ideas
that are behind the invention, whence the complementary character of this legal regime as
applied to software. Moreover, the Directive expressly reserves the possibility of recourse
to patent protection. Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.1.
29. See Beme Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.1.
30. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, pt. 1, No. 4.
31. The Berne Convention guarantees Berne member authors "in respect of works for
which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the
country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to
their nationals... ." Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 5.1.
32. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 5.2. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg &
John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne
Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L.& ARTS 1, 9-12 (1988).
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machine; applications programs (such as the word processing program
WordPerfect), designed to accomplish a given task; mass-produced
programs; and custom-made programs.3 However, as Article 1.2 of
the Directive reminds us, protection extends only to the form of
expression of the program, whether it be in binary object code or in
higher-level language source code. As a result, the functionality of
the program is not in itself the object of protectionY3 As if that
were not sufficiently clear, the Directive adds that the ideas and
principles underlying the program are not protectable These rules
reiterate principles classic to copyright law in EC Member States, as
well as in the U.S. 36 Finally, whatever the requirements of interoper-
ability, it is clear that computer program interfaces37 are potentially
protectable as elements of a program, just like any other original
portion of a program. 8
33. However, the Directive does not include a definition of "computer program"; this
may be justified by the difficulties of such an undertaking and by the absence of significant
practical disagreement on this point. Moreover, most commentators agree with the WIPO
Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software definition of a computer program
as "a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form, which is
capable, when incorporated in a machine-readable medium, of causing a 'computer'--an
electronic or similar device having information processing capabilities-to perform or
achieve a particular task or result." 1 WIPO Proposed Protocol to Berne, supra note 11, at
32. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining a computer program as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result").
34. The principle is familiar in U.S. copyright law as well. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs.,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53-54 (D.
Mass. 1990) (holding that the function of a computer program is an "idea" and is not
protectable under copyright).
35. Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.2.
36. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (excluding ideas, methods and processes from the
coverage of copyright under U.S. law).
37. Paragraph 11 of the Directive's preamble defines interfaces as "the parts of the
program which provide for... interconnection and interaction between elements of software
and hardware .... "
38. See Mickael Lehmann, Software Protection Under the 1991 European Directive,
91/4 D.LT. 7, 10-11 (1991); Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 8; J6r8me Huet, Le reverse
engineering, ou ingenierie inverse, et l'acc&s aux interfaces dans la protection des logiciels
en Europe: questions de droft d'auteur et de droit de la concurrence, 1990 D.S. Chron. 99,
102. It is only necessary to add in this regard that as a practical matter information relating
to interfaces will frequently have a purely obvious or inevitable character, and therefore will
not enjoy protection. See id.
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B. The Condition of Protection: Originality (Article 1.3)
The Directive states explicitly in Article 1.3 that software'must
satisfy the condition of originality in order to be protected. Originali-
ty is a general principle of copyright law applicable to all works
throughout the Community and in the U.S. But, in order to prevent
the kinds of erroneous departures from this principle that had
occurred in certain EC countries where the technical character of
computer programs had led domestic courts to deny copyright
protection on the ground that software was devoid of aesthetic
value,39 Article 1.3 of the Directive further provides that "no other
criteria shall be applied .... " Similarly, the preamble states that "no
tests as to the qualitative or aesthetic merits of the program should be
applied. '
The problem underlying these dispositions concerned the criteria
for evaluating originality, for France and Germany had already
developed different approaches to this issue. The French High Court
had identified the criterion of originality as synonymous with the
"mark of an intellectual contribution," 41 while the German Federal
Supreme Court had required a "clearly higher than average degree of
creativity."'42 In specifying that, to be considered original, a
computer program must be "the author's own intellectual creation,"43
the drafters of the EC text have demonstrated that they do not intend
to impose a high level of creativity; the standard appears to refer to
39. This phenomenon occurred, prior to the 1985 law, in the Judgment of June 4, 1984
(Valadon v. Atari Ireland, Ltd.), Cour d'appel de Paris [Court of Appeal of Paris], 123
R.I.D.A. 178, 180-81 (1985); see also Huet & Maisl, supra note 27, at 40.
40. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 8.
41. See Judgment of Mar. 7, 1986, Cass. ass. pl6n., 1986 Receuil Dalloz-Sirey,
Jurisprudence 405 conclusion J. Cabannes, note B. Edelman (Fr.); Judgment of Mar. 7, 1986,
Cass. ass. plan., 1986 La Semaine Juridique (Juris-Classeur P6driodique) II No. 20631 note
J.-M. Mousseron, B. Teyssi6, and M. Vivant (Fr.); Judgment of Mar. 7, 1986, Cass. ass.
plan., 129 R.I.D.A. 134, 137 (1986), note A. Lucas (Fr.); Judgment of March 7, 1986, Cass.
ass. pldn., 3 REVUE DU DRorr DE LA PROPRi t INDusRiELLE 203, 269 (1986) (Fr.); Andr6
Frangon, Chronique de legislation et de jurisprudence Fran~ais, 39 REVUE TRIMESTRIELL
DE DROIT COMmERCiAL Er DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 397, 400 (1986); cf. COLOMBET, supra
note 1, No. 108.
42. See Judgment of May 9, 1985 (lnkasso-Programm), BGH, 94 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 276, 290 (F.R.G.). As to the differences
between Member States, see generally Nolan, supra note 1, at 132-49 (reviewing German
and French high court decisions).
43. Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.3.
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an average level,44 an intellectual contribution such as the French
High Court formulated in 1986.45 Those who had advocated a
generous interpretation of the originality requirement, so as to permit
coverage of a wide range of computer programs by copyright,' will
be pleased with the Directive's solution.
More importantly, it is clear that the term "originality" in the
Directive is meant to have a uniform, supranational definition; it is
not intended to be a broad, umbrella-like term sheltering a variety of
potentially divergent Member State interpretations. The Directive
does not intend to refer back to Member State law to define or
supplement the definition of originality; the text's effort to explicate
the originality criterion reveals a deliberate effort to render uniform
the conditions of software protection in Europe. This means that, as
regards the interpretation of the notion of originality, the European
Court of Justice will be called upon to play a uniformizing role as the
jurisdiction of ultimate resort for the courts of the twelve Member
States. In case of doubt, one must look to the European Court of
Justice to articulate the meaning to be given to the expression "the
author's own intellectual creation."'47
As the Directive's legislative history emphasizes, and as the text
of the Directive itself makes clear, the basic criterion of originality is
that the program must not have been copied; it must be the creation
of the person who claims to be its author.48 In this respect, the
Directive appears to adopt the traditional Anglo-American concept of
"originality" as primarily meaning "not copied."49  However, as
interpreted in the United States, even this broad concept excludes
44. See Dreier, supra note 1, at 320 ("In view of the legislative history [of the
Directive], however, it should be clear that the [D]irective leaves no further room for an
exceedingly high originality standard such as the German one.").
45. Vivant, supra note 1, No. 8 (correctly observing that because the Community text
does not use the French term apport (contribution), there is less movement toward the patent
law concept of novelty).
46. See, e.g., JMr~me Huet, Les logiciels sont prot6gfs par le droit d'auteur, 1985 D.S.
Chron. 261, No. 10.
47. See Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 8.
48. See Explanatory Memorandum, pt. 2, art. 1.3 ("mhe only criterion which should
be applied to determine the eligibility for protection is that of originality, that is, that the
work has not been copied."); Huet, supra note 46, No. 10 (equating a work's "originality"
with "authorship").
49. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951) ("Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition on actual copying."')
(citation omitted); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
('[flIf by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on
a Grecian Urn" he could claim a copyright in his composition.).
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trivial or banal combinations of instructions. 50  There is a public
domain of expression from which the program must distinguish itself
to be deemed original. Just as in literary works, a dramatist's
reliance on stock scenes and characters may lack originalityS--or
in musical works, the composer's resort to familiar patterns of notes
does not in itself qualify as origina 2-- so in the context of computer
programs, certain instructions or sequences of instructions may be
entirely commonplace to the genre of program at issue.53
Any determination of what is trivial or banal must be made with
reference to the general state of knowledge in the computer program-
ming field. This reliance on the backdrop of programming elements
generally known in the software writing community, however, does
not imply a patent-like "nonobviousness" standard. Although both
the copyright and the patent standards refer to the knowledge of one
ordinarily skilled in the art, the patent standard requires that the
claimed invention exceed the creativity normally expected of such a
patent applicant, while the copyright standard simply requires that the
program not be a clich6. Just as stock devices abound in convention-
al literature, so too must there be correspondingly tried-and-true (or
tired) formulae in computer programming. The difference between
computer programs and more conventional literary works today is
primarily one of recognition. A judge would consider such elements
as the timely fall of the curtain upon the embrace of a play's male
and female protagonists a typical (if today perhaps quaint) suggestion
of the characters' subsequent actions, as well as a means of
moving the plot to a new stage in the characters' relationship; the
judge would therefore be unlikely to entertain a claim of original
authorship in that expression of an ellipsis. Today's often computer-
50. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241, 1255 (2d
Cir. June 22, 1992) (holding that standard programming techniques dictated by external
computing environment, like "stock" literary devices, are not protectable). Cf. Feist Pubs.
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1991) (holding telephone directory
white pages too "typical," "garden-variety," "obvious," and "basic" to be original).
51. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120-122 (2d Cir. 1930)
(holding character and plot elements common to the plays of both plaintiff and defendant too
ill-developed and commonplace to support a copyright).
52. Cf. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), order afj'd sub nom., ABKO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722
F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that two copied motifs in plaintiff's song were trite, but
their combination and number of repetitions was "highly unique").
53. See, e.g., Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1255 (in ascertaining whether a computer program
is protectable, a court must filter out standard programming routines).
54. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1936)
("He finds her facile and the curtain falls in season.").
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illiterate judge might not recognize the software equivalent of the
seasonable curtain, but that does not mean that similar plot-forward-
ing devices do not exist.55 Indeed, as computer science evolves, and
as standardization in the field progresses, the backdrop of public
domain elements (and the ability of judges to perceive them) will
inevitably increase.
There is an important additional limitation on software copyright
in the EC. If the form of a program (or of part of it) is dictated by
its function, then the program (or the relevant portion) should be
excluded from protection. This principle is recognized in the U.S. as
a corollary of the so-called idea/expression dichotomy, under which
ideas, methods and processes contained within a work are not
themselves the subject matter of copyright.56 In Europe, the doctrine
may not be as explicit (or the label may be lacking), but the Direc-
tive's legislative history reveals that the drafters were well aware of
the problem of functionality-particularly regarding interfaces-and
intended to limit protection to those elements not necessary to the
function of the program.57
C. Owners of Rights; Beneficiaries of Protection (Articles 2 and 3)
The Directive offers few surprises regarding the determination
of owners of rights in computer programs. Indeed, in most cases the
Directive refers back to the Member States' domestic laws for the
application of the Directive's specific provisions. Article 2.1 provides
that the "author of a computer program shall be the natural person or
group of persons who has created the program or, where the
legislation of the Member State permits, the legal person designated
as the rightholder by that legislation." The final version of the
55. See, e.g., Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1255 (examples of subroutines found to be "scnes
A faire"---banal to the genre).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); cf. decisions cited supra note 34 (functionality of
program not protectable).
57. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, pt. 1, No. 3.13:
If similarities in the code which implements the ideas, rules or principles occur
as between inter-operative programs, due to the inevitability of certain forms
of expression, where the constraints of the interface are such that in the
circumstances no different implementation is possible, then no copyright
infringement will normally occur, because in these circumstances it is generally
said that idea and expression have merged.
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Directive abandons all reference to commissioned software.58
Commissioned programs therefore remain the property of the
person(s) who created them, albeit at the behest of a third party. In
principle, the creator of commissioned software transfers only the
right to use the program, not the copyright in the work, unless the
contract provides for a transfer of copyright as well.
Article 2.2 provides for joint ownership of programs written
jointly by a group of natural persons. This solution is standard, and
should apply also to software jointly created by juridical persons,
such as by a joint venture of corporations. Co-ownership of software
copyright may not be easy to administer, however, particularly in
those Member States in which exploitation of rights under copyright
requires the unanimous consent of the co-owners.59
The Directive's most important disposition of ownership rights
is contained in Article 2.3, which provides:
Where a computer program is created by an employee in
the execution of his duties or following the instructions
given by his employer, the employer exclusively shall be
entitled to exercise all economic rights in the program so
created, unless otherwise provided by contract.
A program "created by an employee in the execution of [her] duties"
would include those created by employees working in a company's
computer programming department. A program created "following
the instructions given by [her] employer" would include one prepared
by an employee who was not hired as a systems analyst or computer
programmer, but who participated in the creation of a work-related
program-for example, an employee in the accounting department
who contributed to the elaboration or modification of a spreadsheet
58. The first draft of the Directive had provided: "Where a computer program is created
under a contract, the natural or legal person who commissioned the program shall be entitled
to exercise all rights in respect of the program, unless otherwise provided by contract."
Directive Draft I, supra note 1, art. 2.3; see Lucas, supra note 1, at 158.
59. See, e.g., C. PROP. INTELL. arts. 113-3(2), 113-3(3) (Fr.) (Co-authors of a
collaborative work "must exercise their rights by common accord." "In case of disagree-
ment, the courts must rule Eon the exploitation]."). In the United States, joint owners may
separately license rights in the work, subject to a duty to account for profits to their co-
owners. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984). On the other hand, a
joint owner may not "assign the work or grant an exclusive license in it without the written
consent of the other co-owners." MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW
§ 5.4[C] (1989).
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program for the firm.60 The economic context in which software is
written-creation often occurs within large client corporations,
hardware manufacturers, or service organizations-justifies employer
ownership. It is nonetheless worth noting that the Directive's
approach is extremely favorable to the employer, for it very broadly
covers the employee's activities. Moreover, the Directive's designa-
tion of employers as initial copyright owners derogates from the
general copyright rule of several Member States that the creator's
employment status does not prejudice her initial copyright owner-
ship.6 On the other hand, the EC text limits the employer's rights
to economic rights;62 by implication, the employee retains moral
rights. In practice the most relevant moral right is likely to be the
right of attribution, i.e., the employee's right to receive authorship
credit for having created the work. The right of integrity, invoked
against alterations or modifications of the program deleterious to the
creator's reputation,63 may be of uncertain application in this
context. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that the Directive
preserves the possibility of such a claim on the employee's part.r
4
The Directive's ownership rules resemble U.S. copyright's works
made for hire regime,65 at least in part. Under U.S. law, copyright
vests in the work's "author," but the "author" is not always the
work's creator. Under the work for hire doctrine, the employer is
denominated the "author" when the work is created by an employee
pursuant to her employment." In this respect, the EC and U.S. rules
60. The continental European countries in principle grant copyright rights even to an
author who is an employee, although the employer may acquire such rights by agreement.
In Anglo-American law countries, the employer is considered the author and first owner of
the copyright by virtue of the work for hire theory. EUGEN ULMER, COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, bIT ECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
Nos. 56, 57 (1978).
61. See, e.g., C. PROP. INTELL., art. 111-1 (Fr.) (general copyright ownership rule
conferring intellectual property rights on the creator). But see C. PROP. INTELL., art 113-9
(Fr.) ("[A]ll rights recognized to authors ... devolve upon" the employer of the creator of
a computer program.).
62. Directive, supra note 1, art. 2.3.
63. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 6bis(l).
64. There is a tension between an employee's moral rights implicitly recognized in
Article 2.3 and the employer's exclusive right to authorize adaptations without prejudice
under Article 4(b). Some Member States' domestic copyright provisions may bring this
latent conflict into relief. For example, in France, the creator is expressly provided
"inalienable" moral rights. C. PROP. INTELL. art. 121-1. Yet an author may not object to
the modification of a computer program in which he has granted adaptation rights. C. PROP.
INTELL. art. 121-7.
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of "work made for hire").
66. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
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appear to be coextensive, although it remains to be seen whether
courts on either side of the Atlantic apply similar interpretations of
the key terms "pursuant to employment" and "exercise of his
functions." However, under U.S. law, the party commissioning the
creation of a work may also be the "author" if the work is of a kind
specified in the copyright statute and if, in addition, there is a
contract between the creator and the commissioning party declaring
the work to be "for hire."67 To determine if there is a disparity
between EC rules and U.S. rules concerning initial ownership of
copyright in commissioned computer programs, it is necessary to
determine if specially ordered software would be considered a work
for hire under U.S. law. If so, the copyright would vest in the
commissioning party, whereas under EC rules, the copyright would
remain with the creator.
The U.S. statute's list of qualifying commissioned works
generally addresses classes of works other than computer programs:
audiovisual works, periodicals, anthologies, and educational texts and
materials. However, the list also includes "a compilation." The
statute defines a compilation as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship. '68  Arguably, a
computer program-which the statute defines as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring
about a certain result"69-could be considered a compilation of
instructions.7" Were that the case, then the copyright in commis-
sioned computer programs could vest in the commissioning party, and
there would be a disparity between EC and U.S. copyright ownership
rules.71 However, the argument that computer programs are "compi-
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
68. Id
69. Id
70. The statutory list of commissioned works capable of being works made for hire also
includes "an instructional text." Id Arguably, the definition of a computer program as a
"set of statements or instructions" would make it an "instructional text." However, it is clear
from the context of the statute's list of works for hire that the latter refers to pedagogical
materials. Id
71. The disparity would carry significant consequences if an EC country declined to
recognize the ownership status of a U.S. commissioning party on the ground that, under EC
law, the software creator, and not the commissioner, has standing to sue. Cf. Jane C.
Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and Exploitations in International Private Law: the
French Supreme Court and the Huston Film Colorization Controversy, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 135 (1991) (reviewing consequences of international conflicts of authorship status
regarding exploitation of U.S. works made for hire in France). However, an EC Member
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lations" seems to us strained; indeed, the reasoning supporting the
"compilation" characterization would also lead to denominating
literary works in general as "compilations," for any conventional
literary work is also "a work formed by the collection and assembling
of preexisting materials or of data [in this case, words] that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."7 2  If
our conclusion is correct, then computer programs are generally not
the kinds of works envisioned by the statute as commissioned works
for hire, and there is no significant disjunction between the EC and
the U.S. approaches to initial copyright ownership.
D. The Content of Protection: The Rights of Reproduction,
Adaptation, and Distribution (Article 4)
1. Specification of Rights (Article 4(a)-(c))
The Directive concerns only economic rights in software. It
enunciates no substantive rules concerning moral rights, which are left
to the competence of the Member States' internal law. However,
domestic regulation is itself constrained by the Berne Convention,
which requires protection of signatories' rights of attribution and of
integrity.73
With respect to economic rights, the Directive enumerates three
kinds of "exclusive rights." Under the rather clumsy rubric "Restrict-
ed Acts," Article 4 makes subject to the copyright owner's authoriza-
tion:
State court might avoid the conflict by deeming the commissioner-creator work-for-hire
contract as a transfer of copyright ownership, rather than as a designation of authorship
status.
Article 3 of the Directive states: "Protection shall be granted to all natural or legal
persons eligible under national copyright legislation as applied to literary works." Combined
with the concept of copyright ownership, this text concerning beneficiaries of protection is
intended to take into account domestic and international rules concerning recognition of
authorship status. Beneficiaries of protection are not only the EC forum country's nationals,
but also foreigners whose authorship status local legislation acknowledges.
72. Moreover, this expansive and inventive interpretation of "compilation" would be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's narrow and common-law-based interpretation of "work
made for hire" in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
(narrowly construing the definition of "work made for hire" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 not to
include certain kinds of commissioned works failing the common law of agency definition
of employment).
73. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 6bis. See COLOMBET, supra note 1, No. 466;
Andr6 Frangon, Propridt, littiraire et artistique, conventions internationales, in Juris-
Classeur de Droit International, Fascicule 563-B, No. 34 (1977).
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(a) the "permanent or temporary reproduction" of the
program "by any means and in any form, in part or in
whole,"
74
(b) the adaptation of the program, or, more precisely, "the
translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other
alteration of a computer program," and
(c) "any form of distribution to the public," including by
means of rental, but-except as to rental-subject to
the exhaustion of rights upon the first sale.
This enumeration of rights, which corresponds closely to
exclusive rights in the United States under copyright of reproduction,
preparation of derivative works and public distribution, warrants
several observations.
First, although the Directive's concept of reproduction is broadly
understood, and even covers "temporary" as well as "permanent"
reproductions, the Directive makes no provision for the copyright
owner's right to perform publicly or authorize the public performance
of software. At first blush, this absence would seem of no practical
import, for software is marketed by sales of copies. This is true even
when access to programs is by means of on-line services, for the use
of the accessed program on the user's computer constitutes the
making of a copy under the Directive's definition. Nonetheless, it
seems premature to say that the concept of public performance will
play no role in the exploitation of computer programs. Given on the
one hand the wide variety of works expressed in digital form,
extending from scientific works to computer games, and on the other
hand the development of the "look and feel" concept, which addresses
visual and other user-perceptible aspects of the program,76 explicit
74. This is a classic statement of the reproduction right, but the text also makes clear
that it extends to such operations as the loading or storage of the program. This is true in
the United States as well. See COM4iSSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES (CONTU),
FINAL REPORT (1978), quoted in ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 166-68 (3d ed. 1989) (Commission appointed by
Congress in 1976 to study and make recommendations regarding computer software
copyright in the US also concluded that these acts constituted reproductions).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) to (3) (1988) (addressing reproduction, derivative works, and
distribution).
76. Regarding "look and feel," see, e.g., Morrison, supra note 1, at 326-30; Richard H.
Stem, Legal Protection of Screen Displays and Other User Interfaces for Computers: A
Problem in Balancing Incentives for Creation Against a Need for Free Access to the
Utilitarian, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 283 (1990); Jeffrey R. Benson, Note, Copyright
Protection for Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1123 (1988).
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inclusion of a public performance right might have aided application
of the Directive to future, perhaps currently unforeseen, problems of
software exploitation. However, the Directive does include "display-
ing" among the "restricted acts"; the combination of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights of display and of transmission may reach
these future problems.
Second, Article 4(b)'s broadly phrased adaptation right appears
to reserve to software copyright holders a wide array of exclusive
"translation" rights, encompassing not only the revision of a program
from one source code language to another (e.g., from Fortran to
Basic), but also the exclusive right to adapt the program to a variety
of computers (e.g., to convert a program designed for a minicomputer
to one that will function with a PC micro-computer). Similar results
have been achieved in the U.S., albeit not always explicitly under the
rubric of the derivative works right.7
A different provision of the Directive addresses a problem that
has, in the United States, so far eluded the grasp of the derivative
works right. The problem concerns computer programs designed to
neutralize copy-protection codes included on commercialized
software. While a U.S. software producer contended that a program
of this kind-which had been created by reverse engineering
plaintiff's program-was itself a derivative work, or in any event
created a derivative work when combined with a program that
included the copy-protection codes, a U.S. appellate court has rejected
these assertions. 78  The Directive does not endeavor to bring this
kind of activity within the scope of the adaptation right. Rather, it
includes a specific provision, in an article devoted to "special
measures of protection," obliging member nations to provide remedies
against "any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for
commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of
which is to facilitate the unauthorized removal or circumvention of
any technical device which may have been applied to protect a
computer program."79
77. In the United States, Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d
1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1987) recognized the software copyright
owner's exclusive rights over the transportability of programs from one hardware system to
another (in that instance, from a minicomputer to a microcomputer), although the court
phrased its decision in terms of the exclusive right to reproduce the structure, sequence and
organization of plaintiff's program.
78. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1988).
79. Directive, supra note 1, art. 7.1(c).
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Third, as in the United States, the Directive's distribution right
primarily concerns the initial public distribution of copies. Under the
Directive, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to determine
whether, when, and how to release copies to the public. Once a copy
has been sold, however, the distribution right is deemed "exhausted."
The copyright owner therefore has no further right to limit the
disposition of copies once they have been sold.80 Thus, for exam-
ple, the copyright owner may not prevent the resale of used copies of
computer programs. Nonetheless, as is also the case in the United
States after the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of
1990,81 the exhaustion principle does not extend to rental of copies
of computer programs. As a result, even after a copy has been sold,
the copyright owner may prevent the owner of a particular copy from
renting out that copy.
The exemption of the rental of copies of computer programs
from the general rule of exhaustion might also be considered in light
of a proposed EC directive on the rental of copyrighted works
generally.8 2 In fact, compared with video rentals, the software rental
market is probably economically insignificant. The market for rental
of videocassettes for private home viewing is a major one; some EC
countries already recognize that the commercial value of the work is
substantially realized through rentals, and local law accordingly
entitles authors to a share of the rental fees. 3 By contrast, it
appears that software is rented not for its temporary enjoyment, but
in order to make unauthorized copies of the rented program." The
software rental right might best be understood, on both sides of the
Atlantic, not as the exclusive right to develop a new market for the
exploitation of copyrighted programs, but as a means to prevent
rentals altogether. However, given the goal of the Directive's rental
right to prevent clandestine copying, the text should probably have
extended also to gratuitous borrowing of copies of programs.
80. On exhaustion of rights, see infra, part I.D.2. The U.S. version of the exhaustion
rule, known here as the "first sale doctrine," is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
81. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VIII, §§ 802, 803, 104 Stat. 5135, 5143 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (Supp. II 1990)).
82. Proposal for a Council Directive on Rental Rights, Lending Rights, and on Certain
Rights Related to Copyright, COM(90)586 final.
83. See, e.g., 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB1. I] 1281 art. 27 (F.R.G.); Boldtin
Oficial del Estado (Official Gazette) [B.O.E.], No. 27, Nov. 17, 1987, art. 25 (Spain).
84. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S17,577 (1990) (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of
Senator Hatch) (supporting passage of Computer Software Rental Amendments on the ground
that rental is disguised copying).
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2. Exhaustion of Rights (Article 4(c))
The Directive makes explicit reference to the principle known
as "exhaustion of rights," developed primarily in the patent domain.
Its purpose is to avoid the fragmentation of the Common Market that
would otherwise result from enforcement of national or territorial
intellectual property.85 Under the rule of exhaustion, once goods
have been put into circulation in one EC nation, their importation into
another EC nation may not be forbidden. This principle applies to
copyrighted works with respect to the right of reproduction. -6 As a
result, in the absence of an exemption from the rule of exhaustion
(such as that set forth regarding software rental), the marketing of
copies of goods covered by copyright may not be constrained once
the copies have been put into circulation and lawfully obtained.
Thus, for example, if copies of a French computer program have been
lawfully made and sold in France, their subsequent purchase for
resale in Germany affords the German licensee of the reproduction
right no basis for complaint even though the seller of second-hand
copies imported into Germany is competing with the licensee-and
thereby compromising the "exclusivity" of his reproduction right. (Of
course, the German licensee would have grounds for action if the
competitor were importing pirated copies.)
The application of the exhaustion principle to software entitles
the acquirer of a copy, be she a merchant or a consumer, to dispose
of the copy as she would any other kind of goods. The object of the
rule, here as elsewhere, is to forbid restrictions on commercialization
of copies that the original distributor might seek to impose on buyers,
because these restrictions threaten to segment the Common Market.
But, in the software context, the rule should also cut short restrictions
to which users are sometimes subjected, such as requirements that the
program be used on a particular type of machine or at a particular
site, because these limitations also tend to undermine the free
85. See DmiTZ, supra note 6, Nos. 225-249 (surveying the different Member States' laws
on exhaustion of the distribution right and arguing that harmonization of these laws is
particularly urgent.); Jean-Jacques Burst & Robert Kovar, Savoir-faire et libre circulation des
marchandises en droit communautaire, 1986 Juris-Classeur Commercial Annexes, Brevets,
Fascicule 540, No. 28. On the application of the principle of free circulation of goods in the
context of copyright, see COLOMBET, supra note 1, No. 496; Frangon, supra note 6, at 164.
No paragraph in the Directive's preamble adequately clarifies the application of the rule to
this area.
86. The right of public performance does not seem to be subject to the rule of
exhaustion. See Case 62/79, Coditel v. Cin6 Vog Films, 1980 E.C.R. 881, 894, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH); COLOMBET, supra note 1, No. 515.
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circulation of these goods.87 In any event, the idea of exhaustion
should be interpreted as rendering illicit any license or sales clauses
that forbid alienation of the copy. The object of such clauses is to
oblige the purchaser to deal with the supplier for any resale of the
copy; they therefore curb the development of a true Community-wide
software market by hindering the development of security interests in
copies of programs.8 8
As formulated in Article 4(c), the exhaustion rule appears to
apply most readily to mass-produced software; the Directive's
reference to the "sale of a copy of the program" treats the medium of
fixation and the intellectual work as a single entity.89 But the scope
of the exhaustion rule is wider still. Thus, while two kinds of
situations may be distinguished from sales, in one of these cases, the
principle nonetheless continues to apply.
The first situation that initially appears different from a sale
triggering the exhaustion rule is the creation of custom-made
software. In at least some EC countries, the contract with the
software writer may be characterized as a hiring of services, rather
than as a sale. The exhaustion rule nonetheless should apply. This
is because the client receives not only the benefit of the program-
mer's services, but also acquires a copy of the program. It is
appropriate that the client be able to resell that copy, just as she could
resell a mass-produced program.
By contrast, in the second case, a sale should be distinguished
from a rental or a license of temporary user rights in the program.
Even though the rental contract may give rise to the first dissemina-
tion of the product, it is nonetheless clear that the supplier of the
program has not divested himself of the personal property right in the
copy of the program. The client must return the copy once the
87. By contrast, a software copyright owner may permissibly restrict the number of
machines on which the program may be used, because use of the program on more than one
machine entails the making of further copies-a right protected by copyright, and not subject
to exhaustion. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
88. Cf. Dreier, supra note 1, at 322 (emphasizing that the clause limiting the use of a
program to only one machine would be contrary to the principle of exhaustion of rights).
Regarding inalienability clauses, see J&8me Huet, Application du droit des saret&s au
financement des logiciels, in LE FINANCEMEN DES LOGICIELS 19, 27-28 (1988).
89. The Directive does not refer to the sale of the medium of fixation alone, which
would clearly be of no interest to the buyer: software is purchased, as is a machine or a
book, along with the intellectual content which constitutes its utility. A contract for a "right-
to-use license" to software, provided the license is transferred in definitive manner and in
return for consideration, constitutes in reality the sale of a copy of the software. See Huet
& Maisl, supra note 27, at 45-46. Contra Vivant, supra note 1, No. 16.2.
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contract has terminated. The supplier therefore conserves all rights
in the copy and indeed may withdraw it from circulation thereafter.
However, to ensure that the exhaustion rule is not eluded by means
of pseudo rentals, one should be careful to verify the presence of an
indicia of a true rental, for example, that the contract conveys the
user rights for a limited time, in return for corresponding pay-
ments.9"
Although the Directive's provisions governing "restricted acts"
broadly define the software copyright holder's exclusive rights of
reproduction and adaptation, the Directive also establishes an
elaborate array of exceptions to these rights, for the benefit of the
software user. Some of these exceptions are necessary consequences
of the broad definitions of reproduction and adaptation; the software
user in fact could not use the program were the copyright owner's
rights not modified on the user's behalf. Other exceptions, however,
go beyond modifications necessary to the user's quiet enjoyment of
the program, to afford users additional affirmative rights to copy and
modify the work. We therefore will now shift this Article's focus
from the rights of the copyright owner to those of the users of
computer programs.
II. THE RIGHTS OF SoFTwARE USERS (ARTIcLES 5 AND 6)
Article 5 of the Directive sets forth "exceptions to the restricted
acts" and specifies that the "lawful acquirer" of a computer program
need not obtain the copyright owner's permission:
1) to use the program "in accordance with its intended pur-
pose," which includes reproducing the program in conjunc-
tion with running the program on the machine and correct-
ing any errors in the program;
2) to make a back-up copy; and
3) to "observe, study or test the functioning of the program
in order to determine the ideas and principles which
underlie any element of the program if he does so while
90. See Dreier, supra note 1, at 322 ("Exhaustion only takes place if a copy of a
program has been 'sold,' but not if a program has been merely licensed."). The criterion of
sale chosen by Dreier is whether the right to use the program is free of any temporal limit.
Dreier also adds, quite rightly, that only the right of distribution is subject to exhaustion and
that the prerogatives attached to the reproduction right remain with the copyright owner of
the program; notably that of controlling the conditions of reverse engineering as provided by
Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive. Id.
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performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running,
transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to
do."91
Article 6 sets forth the specific conditions under which the user may
decompile (reverse engineer) the program, that is, to transcribe the
program's object code into source code, thereby permitting the user
to read the instructions comprising the program.
It is also important to take into account Article 9 of the
Directive, which declares that "any contractual provisions contrary to"
the user's rights to make a back-up copy, to study the program, and
to decompile the program (within the limits set forth in Article 6)
"shall be null and void. 92 As a result, software copyright owners
and users may derogate contractually only from the user's right to use
the program. Moreover, although the Directive leaves room for
contractual freedom regarding the right to use the program, one
nonetheless may doubt the validity of contract language restricting
user rights such as that contained in "shrink wrap licenses"--adhesion
contracts that purport to take effect once the consumer opens the
packaging of the program.93
We will divide the ensuing discussion of user rights according
to rights subject to contractual derogation on the one hand, and
mandatory user rights on the other.
A. User Rights Subject to Waiver or Modification by Contract
(Article 5.1)
1. Right of Reproduction
Article 5.1 places in the forefront of rights accorded the "lawful
acquirer" the right to copy the program in the course of its use. This
provision is structured as a derogation from Article 4(a)'s exclusive
right of reproduction. Despite the copyright owner's exclusive rights,
the user need not obtain her authorization to engage in this kind of
copying. This result is a natural consequence of the scope of the
91. Directive, supra note 1, arts. 5.1 to 5.3.
92. Id., art. 9.1. In fact, there are provisions in the Directive other than those mentioned
in Article 9 that are mandatory; for example, the principle of exhaustion of rights in Article
4(c) as discussed supra part I.D.2.
93. Cf. Joanna Schmidt-Szalewsld, Conditions gdnrales des contrats et contrats-types,
1990 Juris-Classeur ditions Techniques, Contrats et distribution, Fascicule 60, Nos. 23-24
(under French contract law, actual consent to each condition of a contract is required; consent
to some clauses of a contract does not necessarily imply consent to others).
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reproduction right: software cannot be used without being loaded
into the computer's temporary memory. Because the Directive
defines the reproduction right to cover these acts, the user inevitably
creates reproductions in the course of using the program. The
exception is necessary therefore to permit the user to use the
software.94
The term "acquirer' should be broadly understood to cover any
person contracting with the computer program producer to obtain the
right to use the computer program, regardless of whether the
acquisition occurs as a sale or a rental of the program. However, the
term does not encompass all persons in a contractual relationship with
the acquirer (as opposed to the producer). For example, it should
also be understood that the lawful acquisition of one copy of a
program does not imply a right to transmit or distribute further copies
to multiple users by means of a network, even if these persons are all
contractually bound to the acquirer, for example, by a contract of
employment. Thus, an office that acquires one copy of WordPerfect
may not avail itself of Article 5.1 of the Directive in order to arrange
free access to the program from all employee work stations connected
to the office's local area network. A software copyright owner may,
consistently with the Directive, restrict use of a copy of the program
to a single machine at a time.95 On the other hand, the term "lawful
acquirer' should be construed to include those persons who obtain
ownership of the program through a contract of sale with the first
acquirer, provided, of course, that the seller relinquishes all copies of
the program to the buyer.96 Finally, the requirement that there be
a "lawful acquire?' should disqualify user rights claims by any person
possessing an unauthorized copy of the program.
The Directive also authorizes the lawful acquirer to make a
back-up copy, and further provides that the copyright owner may not
94. Although Article 5.1 allows for "specific contractual provisions" requiring the
copyright holder's authorization to reproduce or adapt the program, even when such acts are
necessary to the use of the computer program, it seems unlikely that a lawful acquirer of the
program would contract to deprive himself of the right to reproduce the program within the
machine, or more generally, of the right to accomplish those acts "necessary for the use of
the computer program." But see discussion infra part I1.A.2 (contracts to limit the user's
right to adapt the program).
95. See Dreier, supra note 1, at 322.
96. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) ("Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the
provisions of this section [recognizing certain rights in owners of copies of computer
programs] may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which
such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the
program.").
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derogate from this right by contract. However, the Directive qualifies
this right by providing that it applies only where the user "ha[s] a
right to use" the program, and where making a back-up is "necessary
for that use."'97 This suggests that if the software distributer includes
a back-up disk together with the initial copy of the program, the user
would not have the right to make additional back-ups."
Many of these features parallel U.S. copyright law. The U.S.
statute permits the owner of a copy of a computer program to "make
or authorize the making of another copy.., created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner."'  Congress
included the provision at the urging of the Commission on New
Technological Uses (CONTU), a body Congress had appointed upon
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act to study and make recommenda-
tions regarding statutory coverage of computer programs. CONTU,
like the EC Commission, determined that acts of reproduction, in
principle subject to the copyright owner's control, occurred not only
at the "output" stage of computer use, but at the "input" stage as
well. Hence, loading a program into the machine's temporary
memory constitutes making a copy of the program. Hence arises the
need to provide for certain user rights.1" In contrast to the Direc-
tive, the U.S. computer program user's rights benefit not a broad class
of "lawful acquirers" but simply the "owner" of the copy of the
program. As a result, under U.S. law, absent an agreement with the
copyright owner, a person merely in lawful possession of a program,
for example a lessee or a person who had borrowed the copy of the
program from its owner, would not be entitled to use the program.
U.S. law also contains a user exception for back-up copies. The
statute permits the owner of a copy of a computer program to make
a new copy "for archival purposes only and [provided] that all
97. Directive, supra note 1, art. 5.2.
98. This situation might arise when the software in question is protected by copy-
protection codes, which the user might otherwise seek to remove in order to make a back-up
copy. The user would not be able to take advantage of a right to do so if the back-up were
already furnished him. Hence, the prohibition on marketing programs to neutralize copy-
protection codes, as provided by Article 7.1(c) of the Directive, reinforces the conclusion that
a software producer may override the user's right to make a backup copy if the producer
furnishes the back-up himself.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
100. CONTU stated: 'Because the placement of a work into a computer is the
preparation of a copy, the law should provide that persons in rightful possession of copies
of programs be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability."
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, quoted in LATMAN, GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 74, at 169.
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archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession
of the computer program should cease to be rightful."'0 ' U.S.
courts have held that the right to create an "archival copy" applies
only to programs in media subject to destruction or degeneration in
the course of normal use, i.e., to programs on disks. Thus, programs
expressed on paper or permanently embedded on a chip, because they
do not present the same risks of volatility, have been excluded from
the exemption." Would the same result apply to the EC Direc-
tive? The Directive protects "the expression in any form of a
computer program."1 3 Thus, the term "program" probably should
be read throughout the Directive to include all media in which the
instructions may be expressed. 3" In that case, is the medium of the
program to which the right to make a back-up copy attaches similarly
indifferent? At least arguably, the term "back-up" copy in the
Directive should be interpreted, like the term "archival" copy in U.S.
law, to reach only those media requiring "back-ups" because there is
a danger that the initial copy will self-destruct.'0
2. Right of Adaptation
Article 5.1 of the EC Directive goes further than permitting the
lawful user to copy the program; it also derogates from the copyright
owner's right of adaptation, by specifying that "the acts referred to in
Article 4(a) and (b) shall not require authorization by the rightholder
when they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the
lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for
error correction." One may infer from this language that the lawful
acquirer benefits from a right to adapt the program to his personal
101. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
102. See, e.g., Micro-SPARC, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D. Mass.
1984) (program published in a magazine); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp.
5, 8-10 (N.D. I1. 1983) (program on a Read-Only-Memory (ROM) disk). But see Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 264-67 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to limit the
right to make archival copies to cases where the original program is threatened by
mechanical or electrical failure).
103. Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.2.
104. See also Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.1 ("the term 'computer programs' shall
include their preparatory design material").
105. By referring to archival copies, in the plural, the U.S. law does not restrict the user
to making one back-up. By contrast, the Directive's text refers to "a" back-up copy.
Directive, supra note 1, art. 5.2. Arguably, the Directive would not authorize the making
of more than one back-up. In that case, backing up a program onto a hard disk would be
permissible, as would copying it to another floppy disk, but the Directive would not permit
the user to copy both to a hard disk and to a floppy disk without the copyright owner's
authorization.
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needs. This person also would seem entitled to perform maintenance
on the program. The latter proposition, however, stirred a surprising
amount of controversy in the course of the drafting and revision of
the Directive. The European Parliament had suggested that the user's
need to maintain the program justified reverse engineering the
program, and in fact analysis of the program is often necessary to the
program's upkeep. 1°6 One should keep in mind that upkeep in-
cludes not only correction of errors but also improvements that might
be made, as well as updates. Of all these user functions, the final
text of Article 5.1 explicitly retains only the user's right to correct
programming errors-the minimum upkeep operation. However,
Article 5.1's text does not foreclose the user from improving the
program; the text prefaces "error corrections" with the non-limitative
designation "including." Presumably, other kinds of adaptations
(Article 4(b) "acts") are also consistent with using the program "in
accordance with its intended purpose." Moreover, the analysis of the
program necessary to upkeep may be undertaken pursuant to Article
5.3, which grants the user the right to "observe, study or test" the
program's functioning. 7
The Directive allows the computer program copyright owner and
the lawful acquirer to contract to limit or deny the user's adaptation
privilege. While the user has an obvious interest in being able to
adapt the program to personal needs, one can also envision that the
copyright owner would reasonably wish to reserve the exclusive right
to modify the software, particularly when the copyright owner not
only sells copies of programs, but also offers software upkeep or
updating services for those programs. The Directive's provision for
alienability of the user's adaptation privilege makes it possible for
software producers to retain control over adaptations. This control
might be exercised in two ways. First, mass-marketed software might
be accompanied by a "shrink-wrap license" under which the user
purports to agree to forego the adaptation privilege. This device
would be effective only to the extent EC member countries enforce
this type of adhesion contract. 10 8 Second, and perhaps more realis-
106. See Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that the European Parliament had
proposed an amendment to authorize decompilation for maintenance purposes, which the
Commission rejected on the ground that the term "maintenance" was too broad and too
indeterminate).
107. See Dreier, supra note 1, at 324 (recognizing, however, that maintenance was not
used as an "independent reason" to justify decompilation) and at 323 (stating that the acts
of reverse engineering authorized by Article 5.3 are not subject to the restrictions in Article
6). Regarding Article 5.3, see infra part II.B.1.
108. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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tically, the producer of custom-made software could make renuncia-
tion of the user's adaptation privilege a term of the (negotiated)
contract for the creation and servicing of the software. Thus, despite
its frequent solicitude for user interests, on this issue, the Directive
ultimately favors the software producers, although it also places on
them the burden to contract out of the user's prerogatives.
The Directive could have reconciled the copyright owner's
Article 4(b) adaptation right with the user's Article 5.1 adaptation
privilege differently. Another approach would have distinguished two
kinds of user-generated adaptations. On the one hand are those that
give rise to a derivative work and that are intended to be marketed as
such. This kind of adaptation is an act that falls squarely within the
traditional scope of protection recognized by every copyright regime.
On the other hand are adaptations made in order to permit the user to
modify the program to her own needs, with no intention of exploiting
the results through marketing the altered program. Arguably, if no
commercialization would be made of the adaptation, the ,author's
rights remain secure. Under this view, it would have been reasonable
to extend to the user a nonwaivable right to personalize her copy of
the software.' 9 Making the right inalienable need not prejudice the
interests of software producers who also service the programs they
sell. In these instances, the producer is often servicing programs
exploited by multiple users, for example, over an office network. Just
as our prior analysis indicated that the "lawful acquirer's" right to
"use" the program by reproducing it in a machine's internal memory
should be limited to an individual acquirer's use of an individual
program on an individual machine at any one time, 10 so should the
user's privilege to adapt the program be understood to be equally
spatially and temporally constrained.
Finally, whether the user is engaged in reproducing or in
adapting the program, the Directive restricts these acts to those "in
accordance with [the program's] intended purpose." By contrast,
while the U.S. Copyright Act permits certain users to copy and to
adapt, this particular limitation on the user's rights is not specified in
the U.S. statute. Moreover, one U.S. federal appeals court has
declined to interpret the statute as imposing such a restriction. In
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,"' the court rejected the
109. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (adaptations of the program made by owners of copies of the
program may not be transferred without the authorization of the copyright owner).
110. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
111. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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contention that defendant's copying and adaptation of plaintiff's copy-
protection program in order to create a program that would defeat the
copy-protection code exceeded the statutory rights of the owner of the
copy of a program. The court held: "[the statute] contains no
language to suggest that the copy it permits must be employed for a
use intended by the copyright owner, and, absent clear congressional
guidance to the contrary, we refuse to read such limiting language
into this exception."' 2 The EC has supplied the clarity lacking in
the U.S. legislation.
We turn now to user rights that the Directive has explicitly
insulated from contractual waiver or variation.
B. User Rights Not Subject to Waiver or Modification by Contract:
Reverse Engineering and its Limits (Articles 5.3 and 6)
Two provisions of the Directive address the difficult question of
reverse engineering: Article 5.3 rather briefly, and Article 6 in
copious detail.
1. The Right to Analyze the Program (Article 5.3)
Introduced by the Commission in a modified version of the
proposed Directive, following the European Parliament's review of
the prior text,"3 Article 5.3 is difficult to interpret. It entitles "the
person having a right to use a copy of a computer program"" 4 to
"observe, study or test [its] functioning... in order to determine the
ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program."
This text seems to accord the user a full right to analyze the program.
This contrasts with Article 6, which also addresses program analysis,
but from the angle of decompilation, and which circumscribes the
decompilation right within a variety of restrictions."5 The contrast
112. Id. at 261.
113. "Whereas a person having a right to use a computer program should not be
prevented from performing acts necessary to observe, study or test the functioning of the
program provided that these acts do not infringe the copyright in the program . .. .
Directive Draft II, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 17. This paragraph was retained in the final
version. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 19.
114. This terminology is used to designate the beneficiary of the right provided by this
clause, but it seems that one can consider the phrase as the equivalent of "lawful acquirer,"
which has already been given a broad interpretation. See supra part ll.A.1.
115. Commentators have not greatly illuminated the juxtaposition of the two texts, see,
e.g., Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 10-12; Vivant, supra note 1, No. 17.3. Compare Dreier,
supra note 1, at 323 (reconciling this duality of texts and suggesting that Article 5.3 should
justify acts of reverse engineering without Article 6 limitations).
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is jarring because one way to "determine the ideas and principles"
that underlie the program is to reverse engineer the program; both
texts therefore might seem to concern reverse engineering." 6
Moreover, Article 9 of the Directive prohibits contractual derogations
from both Article 5.3 and Article 6.
In fact, two guidelines must be taken into account in order to
grasp the meaning of Article 5.3. First, it appears that one should
interpret Article 5.3 by distinguishing its object from that of Article
6. From that perspective, it seems that the kind of study of the
program envisioned in Article 5.3 should not require the initial
"translation of [the] form" of the program's code." 7  Otherwise,
Article 5.3 would fall squarely within the domain of Article 6, that is,
within decompilation as such. Second, according to the terms of
Article 5.3, the user may analyze the program only "if he does so
while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running,
transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to do."" 8
One can conclude that Article 5.3 extends to the user the
nonwaivable right to analyze the program to the full extent desired,
but that the means by which he may do so are limited; he may not
retranscribe the object code of the program into source code permit-
ting an exhaustive analysis of the program. Even this limitation,
however, may seem perplexing. After all, both patent and copyright
law normally entitle users to analyze another's work." 9 The leeway
these laws allow for study of prior works promotes the development
of the arts and the progress of science. Once the work is divulged,
the owner of a copy should be able to examine it thoroughly to learn
the creative steps leading to its production. For example, suppose an
artist wished to apply X-ray analysis to a predecessor's painting to
discover the composition of brush strokes as well as the artist's
116. For an argument that Article 5.3 also concerns reverse engineering, see Dreier,
supra note 1, at 323 ("the reverse engineering acts permitted by Article 5.3 are not subject
to the restrictions which Article 6 stipulates for the acts of decompilation.") The two texts'
shared history is outlined by Verstrynge, who declares that the decompilation provisions of
Article 6 should not apply when the holder of the program can obtain the information about
interoperability by using the methods of analysis provided by Article 5.3. Verstrynge, supra
note 1, at 10-11. Regarding the meaning of the term "decompilation" as distinguished from
"reverse engineering," see infra part II.B.2.
117. Certainly, Article 6.1 includes "reproduction of the code and the translation of its
form" under the term "decompilation." See infra part II.B.2. However, here it can only refer
to the translation of the code because reproduction is explicitly covered and permitted by
Article 5.3 when its purpose is loading or storage. Thus, only translation can be reserved
to Article 6 and excluded from Article 5.3.
118. Directive, supra note 1, art. 5.3.
119. See, e.g., Huet, supra note 38, at 100-01.
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second thoughts, or pentimenti. Even though the X-ray plate might
constitute a "copy" or "adaptation" of the painting, the U.S. copyright
law "fair use" doctrine, and its Berne Convention analogue, 
120
would most likely tolerate the X-ray analysis, at least so long as no
commercial use was made of the plate. The creator of a work of
authorship should not be able to use the copyright law to shield
himself from inquiries into the creative process-unless he takes
refuge in the law of trade secrets and refuses to divulge the work.
To the extent that the Directive truncates the user's right to
study the program, it appears inconsistent with the general copyright
approach. Nonetheless, despite its reservations, the Article 5.3 right
to observe and study the program still expresses a principle favoring
users.121 Granted, it might have been preferable for the Directive,
rather than setting forth broad exclusive rights and later qualifying
them with a variety of user-friendly exceptions, simply to have
provided that the copyright owner's monopoly does not extend to
these user activities. In any event, it should not matter that technical
reasons, arising from the need to make a copy of the program within
the machine in order to use or study the work, led to treating this user
rights question as an exception to the author's exclusive right of
reproduction. Article 5.3 authorizes studying the program, and
Article 9, by prohibiting agreements to the contrary, renders mandato-
ry the right to "observe, study or test." This constitutes a right to
learn the "ideas and principles" underlying the program, which not
only are excluded as such from protection under Article 1.2, but
also-as a result of Article 5.3-are rendered accessible to any lawful
possessor of the program.
However, it is also true that while, technically, loading or
running a program in the machine may permit the user to study it,
these procedures will not yield complete knowledge of the program.
That cannot be achieved without decompiling the program.
2. Decompilation (Article 6)
The difficult and highly controversial question of decompilation
is governed by Article 6, which sets forth a compromise solution.
That text provides in part:
The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required
where reproduction of the code and translation of its form
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1990); Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.2.
121. Contra Vivant, supra note 1, No. 17.3 (stating that the Directive poses the principle
of "the illegality of reverse engineering").
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... are indispensable to obtain the information necessary
to achieve the interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs .... 1 22
The first element of the compromise was already expressed in Article
5.3, which sets forth the principle of the lawful acquirer's right to
analyze the program. Article 6 concerns only decompilation per se,
that is, only one of the means of analysis capable of implementation
by reverse engineering. Decompilation may be defined as the
rewriting, on the basis of the object code, of a pseudo-source code of
the program-a version in humanly intelligible high-level language,
such as the original programmer herself might have written to
produce the machine-code version accessible to the user.
The second element of the compromise is found in the text of
Article 6, which permits reconstitution of the source code, but only
for the purpose of achieving interoperability of programs, and only to
the extent that reverse engineering enables the user to access
information concerning the interfaces of the decompiled program.
Article 9 provides that the decompilation right is imperative; the user
may not contract this right away. 23
Article 6 responds to two major problems that reverse engineer-
ing attempts to address: communication between systems on open
networks (because to connect to the network one must learn the
communications protocols of other programmers); and creation of
systems that are compatible with the standards imposed by the
marketplace (an issue that arises most acutely in the domain of micro-
computers). The Directive's preamble repeatedly emphasizes the
importance of these issues. Paragraph 9 declares that "the Communi-
ty is fully committed to the promotion of international standardiza-
tion" (and thus favors communication on open networks); paragraphs
10 and 11 stress that "the function of a computer program is to
communicate and work together with other components of a computer
system" and that "the parts of a program which provide for such
interconnection and interaction between elements of software and
hardware are generally known as 'interfaces,"' while paragraph 12
122. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.1.
123. However, the supplier may be able to restrain decompilation by publishing
information on interfaces. This is because Article 6.1(a) bars decompilation by the user if
information necessary to achieve interoperability has already been made available by the
supplier. See Dreier, supra note 1, at 324. But see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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defines "interoperability" as "the ability to exchange information and
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.""'2
This definition is crucial. It should engender a rather broad
conception of lawful decompilation and lawful exploitation of the
results of decompilation. This is because the Directive's goal is to
achieve the exchange of information between programs and the use
of one program together with another under the best technical
conditions, that is, with full knowledge of the functional aspects of
the interfaces of the studied program. This policy invites those who
implement the Directive to adopt a flexible interpretation of the
provisions on decompilation. Moreover, this impression is reinforced
by review of the conditions that Article 6.1 imposes on the exercise
of the decompilation right, as well as those imposed by Article 6.2 on
the exploitation of the information discovered through decompilation.
a. Conditions Justifying Decompilation
Despite their restrictive appearance, the terms the Directive sets
forth for exercise of the decompilation right are in fact rather
generous. Article 6.1's long list of conditions establishes rather
obvious requirements when it states: (a) that decompilation may be
performed only by a person having the right to use the program;
1
2
and (b) that the information sought has not already been rendered
accessible.126 The requirement in 6.1(c) that the right to decompile
is "confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary
to achieve interoperability" was already set forth at the outset of
Article 6.1, which permits decompilation "indispensable to obtain the
124. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., paras. 9-12. There are other clauses in the preamble
to note: paragraphs 21 and 22 correspond to Article 6; paragraph 27 contemplates the
application of the competition rules under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC TREATY if a
supplier refuses to allow third parties access to the information necessary for interoperability;
and above all paragraph 28, which states that the Directive does not affect either concluded
arrangements concerning publication of interfaces in the telecommunications sector or
standardization agreements in the informational technology and telecommunications sectors.
125. However, a person authorized by the lawful acquirer could also perform the
decompilation. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (permitting an owner of a computer program to "make
or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation") (emphasis supplied); Micro-SPARC,
Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984) (keying into digital form on clients'
computer disks programs originally published in magazines).
In general, the Directive's use of inconsistent terminology in referring to the
legitimate user is unfortunate. Article 5.1 discusses the "lawful acquirer"; Article 5.3
concerns the person "having a right to use a copy of [the] program"; and Article 6.1(a)
addresses the ". .. acts.., performed by the licensee or by another person having a right
to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized to do so."
126. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. But see infra note 131 and accompany-
ing text.
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information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an indepen-
dently created program with other programs ... ." The guiding
notion is that decompilation is authorized only for the purpose of, and
only to the extent necessary for, the achievement of interoperability.
That said, further examination of two questions will allow us to
test how much leeway the Directive in fact allows users. The first
question addresses the scope of the interoperability principle. Is the
interoperability envisioned by the Directive limited to decompilation
in order to create a program that will interact with the decompiled
program? The text of Article 6 requires that the "independently
created computer program" derived from the information elicited
through decompilation be interoperable "with other programs." The
text contains no restriction regarding the identity of the program with
which the decompiler's program will be interoperative. We therefore
conclude that the scope of the decompilation privilege is broad
indeed.
The following example may help illustrate the breadth we
perceive. The interface software of a microcomputer is known as the
"basic input-output system" or "BIOS." Its purpose is to link the
operating system software, which governs the internal functioning of
the machine, to the applications software. The applications software
includes the programs with which the user interacts, for example, the
word processing, spreadsheet or graphics programs.' 27 The BIOS
manages the ensemble of communications between the applications
and the operations software. Suppose a hardware manufacturer
wished to design a BIOS that would enable his machines to run
applications software designed for other microcomputers, such as the
IBM PC, and that IBM had not published the specifications of its
BIOS interfaces. Is the manufacturer confined to studying or
decompiling the interfaces of applications software designed for the
IBM PC, or may he decompile the interfaces of IBM's BIOS itself in
order to discover the elements of compatibility with IBM-compatible
applications software? 128  Put another way, does the Directive
127. Another example in the area of communication systems is that of "network
management" software.
128. These facts are similar to those at issue in the United States. In Apple Computer
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984), defendant Franklin had sought to design an Apple-compatible computer that would
run the vast variety of applications software designed for the Apple machine. However,
Franklin achieved that compatibility by simply copying the Apple operating system. This
would not be permitted under the EC Directive. To achieve Apple-compatibility, Franklin
would be permitted to analyze and decompile the interfaces of the Apple BIOS, but Franklin
would thereafter be obliged to prepare its own program exploiting that information.
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authorize the lawful user to decompile IBM's BIOS program in order
to devise a new program that will compete with or substitute for the
decompiled program?
The answer, we believe, is that he surely may decompile the
BIOS. 2 9 The Directive authorizes decompilation not only for the
purpose of acquiring information about a program in order to design
a program to interact with it, but also in order to create any kind of
program using the interface information acquired from the decompiled
program. 3 ' This solution is appropriate to the Directive's goal of
encouraging interoperability, for it would be technically quite difficult
to construct an IBM-compatible BIOS only on the basis of informa-
tion acquired from the interfaces of IBM-compatible applications
programs.
A second question concerns the nature of the interfaces subject
to decompilation: are these limited to interfaces expressly included by
the creator of the decompiled program, or may the decompiler in
effect introduce new interfaces? Because the Directive does not
specify only interfaces envisioned by the original programmer, we
conclude that the decompiler may seek information concerning any
kind of interoperability to which the program may lend itself."'
These two conclusions prompt an additional observation
regarding the scope of the decompilation right. Although the right is
restricted to decompilation necessary to acquire information on
interoperability, in practice it seems difficult if not impossible to
impose meaningful limits on the extent to which a program may be
decompiled. In a computer program, many elements are closely
linked to those that directly affect interoperability, so that it is often
necessary to understand the functioning of the whole program in
129. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY pt. 2, ch. I, §4(g) (1991); Lehmann, supra note 38, at 11; cf. Verstrynge, supra
note 1, at 11 ("[Tihe interoperable program which the reverse engineer creates independently
of the programs he has analyzed may in fact find itself in competition with those
programs.").
130. See Verstrynge, supra note 1, at 13 ("the text does not impose on [the reverse
engineer] that he can only reverse engineer programs he intends to operate with.").
131. This conclusion arguably conflicts with Article 6.1(b) of the Directive, which
permits decompilation to acquire interoperability information when the information "has not
previously been readily available. . ." This text permits the inference that the copyright
owner may forestall decompilation by making interface information available. See supra
note 123. However, the copyright owner would naturally only disclose information regarding
interfaces she had intended to be present in the program. Short of disclosing the entire
source code, the copyright owner could not reveal the code corresponding to unintended
interfaces. Thus Article 6.1(b) should not deprive the user of the possibility of researching
all interfaces by legal methods.
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order to create a program that can successfully exploit the decompiled
program's interfaces. To attempt to isolate interoperability informa-
tion from the program as a whole is as artificial, and futile, as
endeavoring to confine the knowledge, for example, of a manufac-
turer of tires for airplanes to the dimensions of the wheels, without
revealing anything about the other elements that necessarily influence
the tires' construction, such as the weight of the plane or its runway
speed.
The apparent limits on the amount of decompilation the user
may perform are unrealistic for another reason as well. The decompi-
ler may not know where in the program the elements concerning
interfaces are located; she therefore may be obliged to decompile the
entire program in order to find the pertinent sections. As a result, it
becomes clear that the conditions justifying decompilation are rather
open-ended. In fact, it appears that as a practical matter the program
in its entirety may be subject to decompilation. The Directive
imposes few meaningful restrictions on the threshold matter of
whether or not a program may be decompiled. Our inquiry therefore
shifts to a subject more susceptible to effective regulation: the
delineation of exploitations to which the person effecting the
decompilation lawfully may put the resulting information, without the
copyright owner's approval.
b. Exploitation of Information Acquired Through Decompilation
The Directive's real restrictions on decompilation pertain to the
exploitation of information acquired by means of decompilation.
Article 6.2 makes clear that information may be used only to the
extent necessary to achieve interoperability, and any program
exploiting this information must be "independently created."
13 2
Thus, one may not decompile a program solely for the purpose of
creating a "knock-off' program that is substantially similar in its
expression to the initial work. 133 This is a classic principle of
copyright law.
The phrase "independently created computer program!' suggests
that the program created by the person who performed the reverse
engineering must itself be this person's own creation. Although this
person may well be a potential competitor of the creator of the first
program, the new program must not be a literal reproduction of the
decompiled program, nor may it be too closely inspired by it.
132. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.2(a).
133. Ia, art. 6.2(c). Article 6.2(b) prohibits the communication to third parties of
information acquired by decompilation, except when necessary to interoperability.
[30:327
1992] COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC SOFIWARE DIRECTIVE 365
However, as noted above, this rule simply recalls fundamental
copyright principles. Hence, one may perceive something more in the
Directive's phrase. Indeed, a widespread practice in the computer
programming profession suggests that one can impose a more
stringent standard regarding the manner of exploiting information
derived from decompilation. The recommended method follows the
so-called "clean-room technique," which involves two successive
teams of programmers. The first team decompiles the program and
identifies information concerning interoperability. The second, never
having encountered the decompiled program, then creates a competing
program incorporating the information (in the form of specifications)
communicated by the first team. This method hels ensure the
independence of the creation of the second program.
However, whatever the method used, the prohibition on creating
a program, or part of a program, similar to the decompiled program
is not all-encompassing. Copying and exploitation nonetheless may
occur when the decompiled program's instructions are banal or
standard, or if the form of the program is dictated by the function it
performs.
135
Article 6.3 imposes a final limitation on the decompilation
privilege established in the rest of Article 6: that privilege "may not
be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in
a manner which unreasonably prejudices the right holder's [sic]
legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal exploitation of the
computer program."136 It is difficult to foresee the impact of this
provision. The language is taken from a section of the Berne
Convention that allows member countries to "permit the reproduction
of [literary] works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work
and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author." 137 Within the context of the Berne Convention, consistent
interpretation of this language has yet to emerge; indeed, the notion
134. The "clean room technique" is consistent with Article 6.2(b)'s conditions on giving
decompilation-derived information to others: the information may not be communicated
"except when necessary for the interoperability of the independently created computer
program." In a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
defendant's recourse to the clean room technique contributed significantly to the court's
determination that defendant had not copied protectable expression from plaintiff's program.
See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241, 1248-49 (2d Cir. June
22, 1992).
135. See supra notes 50, 53-57 and accompanying text.
136. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.3.
137. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.2.
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of a "normal exploitation" has proven elusive with respect to
traditional literary works, and may prove even more so with respect
to computer programs.13 In the context of the Directive, should
Article 6.3 require interpretation, one may anticipate that it will fall
to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to decide what
meaning to give the phrases "normal exploitation" and "unreasonably
prejudice legitimate interests" in the particular case of decompila-
tion139
It may be too early to tell whether the decompiler enjoys broader
prerogatives under the Directive or under U.S. copyright law. The
U.S. approach to decompilation continues to evolve, and is currently
in ferment. Since 1991, one federal district court and three federal
appellate courts have confronted the problem at the root of decompil-
ation: the establishment of unauthorized copies as an intermediate
step in the creation of a potentially competing (albeit not necessarily
substantially similar) end-product. One appellate court has con-
demned the practice as copyright infringement, the other two have
tolerated it to varying degrees under the fair use exception to
copyright infringement.
In its 1991 decision in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp.
v. Donnelley Information Publishing Inc.,14° the Eleventh Circuit
sustained the intermediate copying theory of infringement. The court
found the defendant Donnelley infringed plaintiff Bellsouth's yellow
pages by loading Bellsouth subscriber information into Donnelley's
computer and creating sales lead sheets that permitted Donnelley to
solicit additional advertising from Bellsouth's customers. Although
the sales sheets were organized differently from the yellow pages, the
appellate court upheld the finding of infringement primarily on the
ground that defendant had established an intermediate infringing copy
by hiring a third party to key Bellsouth's compilation of subscriber
information into a data base fixed on a magnetic tape. Donnelley
138. See, e.g., Frangon, supra note 72, No. 58; Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of
Protected Works for University Research or Teaching, 39 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 181,
186-87 (1992).
139. It seems clear, at least, that within the structure of the Directive, the term "normal
exploitation" cannot encompass an exclusive right to create and distribute compatible
software.
140. 933 F.2d 952 (llth Cir. 1991). [Editor's note: subsequent to submission of this
article, by order dated November 4, 1992, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel decision
in Bellsouth and ordered rehearing en banc. Bellsouth Advertising & Pub. Corp. v.
Donnelley Information Pub., Inc., No.89-5131, 1992 WL 317393 (11th Cir. Nov. 4, 1992).]
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created its sales sheets from the data base downloaded from the
magnetic tape.
141
Similarly, a federal district court in California in Sega Enter-
prises v. Accolade, Inc.,'142 awarded a preliminary injunction to a
software producer who complained that defendant had reverse
engineered subroutines contained in plaintiffs videogame consoles
and cartridges, in order to produce unauthorized videogame programs
that would be compatible with plaintiffs consoles. Defendant had
disassembled the object code of plaintiffs game programs, and had
translated the object code into higher level code. Defendant then
made copies of the translated program and worked from them in
order to devise videogame programs that were not themselves
infringingly similar to any of plaintiff's games. The court nonetheless
found infringement on the basis of the intermediate copy that
defendant had made by translating the source code.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. That court agreed that creation of
intermediate copies was prima facie infringing-indeed the Ninth
Circuit had itself upheld that basis for liability in a decision involving
a work other than a computer program.1 43 Nonetheless, the court
held that intermediate copying for the purposes of studying a
computer program qualified as a fair use. The court stated:
[W]e conclude based on the policies underlying the
Copyright Act that disassembly of copyrighted object code
is, as a matter of law, a fair use of the copyrighted work if
such disassembly provides the only means of access to
those elements of the code that are not protected by
copyright and the copier has a legitimate reason for seeking
such access.'"
The court found that defendant's desire to create independent
videogames that would be compatible with plaintiffs hardware, but
141. Id. at 958-59. However, basing liability on intermediate copying when the final
result that is distributed to the public would not be deemed infringing may be inconsistent
with the approach to copyright protection enunciated by the Supreme Court in Feist Pubs.
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). See Jane C. Ginsburg, No
"Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Infornation after Feist v. Rural
Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 351-52 (1992) (discussing Bellsouth).
142. 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992), rev'd, No. 92-15655, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
26645 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1992).
143. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979) (fortune-telling
cards).
144. Sega, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26645, at *16-17.
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that would not be substantially similar to videogames licensed by
plaintiff, constituted such a reason. 45
For the Ninth Circuit, the "hybrid nature of computer programs"
justified intermediate copying where no other means of access to a
program's ideas and functions exists. A computer program, as an
"article[] that accomplish[es] tasks," will be composed of "many
logical, structural, and visual display elements that are dictated by the
function to be performed, by considerations of efficiency, or by
external factors such as compatibility requirements and industry
demands."' 6 Many, indeed most, of these elements would not be
protected by copyright. 47 But disclosure of the program only in
object code may render these elements inaccessible. Thus, while they
may in theory be freely copied, they are in fact shielded from
reproduction, so long as the format in which they are disseminated
remains indecipherable. As the Ninth Circuit stressed, "The unpro-
tected aspects of most functional works are readily accessible to the
human eye."14  Where disassembly offers the only means of
obtaining access to or understanding unprotected aspects of the
program, disassembly must be permitted, lest the copyright owner
"gain[] a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his
work-aspects that were expressly denied protection by Con-
gress.' 49
In a decision rendered shortly before the Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,"5 0 anticipating the jurisprudence
of the Ninth Circuit,' also held that intermediate copying could be
a fair use. The court stated:
The Copyright Act permits an individual in rightful
possession of a copy of a work to undertake necessary
efforts to understand the work's ideas, processes, and
methods of operation.
145. Id. at *33-34.
146. Id. at *40.
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (no protection for ideas, systems, methods, and processes).
148. Sega, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26645, at *43.
149. Id. at *47.
150. No. 91-1293, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21817 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 1992).
151. When the Federal Circuit rules on legal issues not exclusively assigned to it, such
as copyright, it "applies the law which would be applied by the regional circuit." Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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The copyright holder has a property interest in
preventing others from reaping the fruits of his labor, not
in preventing the authors and thinkers of the future from
making use of, or building upon, his advances....
. . . When the nature of a work requires intermediate
copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copy-
righted work, that nature supports a fair use for intermedi-
ate copying. Thus, reverse engineering object code to
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a
fair use.
15 2
But, for the Federal Circuit, reverse engineering ceases to be a fair
use if the decompiler goes beyond learning the program's ideas and
processes to making a substantial reproduction of the program for
commercial purposes.
Fair use to discern a work's ideas, however, does not
justify extensive efforts to profit from replicating protected
expression.... [Flair use in intermediate copying does not
extend to commercial exploitation of protected expression.
The fair use reproductions of a computer program must not
exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected
elements of the work.'53
Both the Federal and the Ninth Circuits' treatments of the
reverse engineering issue recall the Directive's resolution: one may
decompile a predecessor's program to understand its functions, but
the knowledge thus acquired must be put to the creation, not of a
reprise of the copied work, but of an independently authored, albeit
potentially competing, program. Similarly, as both opinions stated,
and as the Ninth Circuit particularly emphasized, decompilation will
qualify as a fair use only where there is no other means of access to
the unprotected programming information. However, the Federal
and Ninth Circuits' approaches to decompilation appear more
generous than the Directive's, for they are not limited to acquisition
and exploitation of information regarding program interfaces. Even
though, as we have seen, that limitation in the Directive does not
seem to restrict much decompilation, it does confine the use to which
the second-comer may put her knowledge of the source code. Under
the Directive, the decompiler may not exploit information unrelated
152. Atari, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21817 at * 27-29.
153. MaL at *30.
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to "interoperability" between programs. 154 By contrast, the Federal
Circuit's analysis would permit the reverse engineer to use informa-
tion pertaining to a variety of program elements that do not necessari-
ly communicate with other programs. The Ninth Circuit, staking a
middle ground, did not explicitly limit the scope of its fair use
analysis to the context of hardware/software compatibility, but
emphasized that "[t]he need to disassemble object code arises, if at
all, only in connection with operations systems, system interface
procedures, and other programs that are not visible to the user when
operating-and then only when no alternative means of gaining an
understanding of those ideas and functional concepts exists. '55
The following example may illustrate the contrast between the
EC and the evolving U.S. delineation of permissible decompilation.
A word processing program, such as WordPerfect, contains, in
addition to the word processing elements with which the user
interacts, elements that link the program to programs governing
printer functions, and that connect the program to a variety of related
programs, such as spell-checkers and thesauruses. Under the
Directive, a programmer wishing to create a spell-checker that would
work with WordPerfect would be permitted to exploit information
derived from decompiling the WordPerfect program, but only insofar
as that information relates to the interaction of the word processing
and spell-checking programs and is not otherwise available. Under
the Federal Circuit's approach, it appears that all information obtained
from reverse engineering and making an intermediate high-level
language copy of WordPerfect could be exploited to create not only
a WordPerfect-compatible spell-checker, but a rival to WordPerfect
itself. However, the resulting program could not reproduce the
original copyrighted aspects of the decompiled work. Under the
Ninth Circuit's approach, disassembly of the code to create a
WordPerfect compatible program could be fair use. The fair use
claim of the WordPerfect substitute seems more tenuous, because the
Sega decision itself addressed only a program designed to work
together with, rather than to replace outright, the decompiled work.
154. Although paragraph 12 of the preamble to the Directive offers a very broad
definition of interoperability ("whereas such interoperability can be defined as the ability to
exchange information and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged"), the
interoperabiity targeted by Article 6 seems limited to exchanges of information between
computer programs, rather than between software and users.
155. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., No. 92-15655, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26645, at
*24-25 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1992).
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Returning to the terms of the Directive, we should make two
related points concerning interoperability of software programs within
the EC scheme. First, the software producer himself can make
available information concerning interfaces, and thereby can curtail
the decompilation right. As a practical matter, this is a better
solution, for decompilation is a long and costly process. Moreover,
if the first producer makes frequent improvements or updates to the
program, the decompiler may have to decompile repeatedly, in order
to acquire the newer information-hence the desirability of voluntary
communication of interface information. The first producer need not
make this information unconditionally available to the general public;
it can be communicated pursuant to contractual agreements with
interested purchasers. Thus furnished, interface information need not
be sought by means of decompiling. 156 The Directive anticipates
this kind of voluntary communication, for it limits the decompilation
right to instances where "the information necessary to achieve
interoperability has not previously been readily available .... ,157
The conditions of the Directive are satisfied if the information
is "readily available." Of course, the information also must be
complete and easy to implement. Moreover, nothing in the Directive
prohibits the disclosing producer from demanding a fee for the
disclosure, so long as the charge is not so high as to discourage
demand. In that case, the user's right to decompile might re-attach.
This analysis suggests that contracts can govern the implementation
of the interoperability principle.
Second, the EC rules of competition law also may apply to
software copyright, as the Preamble reminds us in declaring that the
Directive does not exclude "the application of the competition rules
under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty if a dominant supplier refuses
to make information available which is necessary for interoperability
as defined in this Directive." 158  One may infer that, even if
competition remains possible, there may be cases where competition
would be too expensive or too risky, for example, because of the
rapid development of computer programs, and that therefore the rapid
communication of information concerning interoperability would be
the only reasonable solution. If the supplier (copyright owner)
156. This analysis applies only to interfaces envisioned by the first software producer.
When the decompiler is inserting an unforeseen interface, the first producer cannot protect
herself against decompilation by divulging interface information.
157. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.1(b). But see supra note 131 and accompanying text
(difficulty of preempting decompilation when user seeks to explore unintended interfaces).
158. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 27.
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refused, application of competition law principles might compel him
to disclose interface information, just as IBM was constrained in 1984
to disclose the interfaces of its IBM/370 system and its SNA
network.159 Moreover, because the rules of the Directive must be
incorporated into Member State legal systems, there is no doubt that
the inclusion of these competition law principles in the articulation of
informatics policy will occur not only on the Community-wide level,
but also within the domestic law of each Member State.
Thus, the Directive opens three routes to access to information
concerning interoperability of computer programs: research by means
of lawful decompilation; contracts among members of the trade
(professional program suppliers and professional users); and regula-
tions imposed by authorities charged with oversight of the competi-
tion rules. This last means of access to information should be equally
applicable to the other sources of computer program protection, such
as patent and trade secret, that Article 9 reminds us are also available
to software producers.
CONCLUSION
The EC Software Directive ratifies and reinforces the trend in
many Member States toward inclusion of computer programs within
the scope of copyright protection. The Directive goes further than
some national laws had, by explicitly declaring computer programs
to be literary works and thus entitling them, in principle, to full
copyright status, both as a matter of domestic law and as a matter of
international copyright law under the Berne Convention. Nonetheless,
the Directive does not regulate computer programs in a manner
completely coextensive with other literary works, for the Directive
elaborates substantial user rights that may exceed the privileges
traditionally accorded consumers of other literary works. The
Directive entitles users to make copies and adaptations of computer
programs for their personal use in connection with running the
program on the machine. This prerogative might be analogized to the
right, found in the copyright laws of many Member States, to engage
in private copying. But the Directive also implements a policy
favoring standardization and intercommunication in the informatics
industry, by permitting users to decompile programs in order to
159. IBM agreed to this disclosure after a hearing in an EC Commission investigation
for abuse of dominant market position; the disclosure agreement was renewed in 1988. See
generally J ROmE HuuT & HUBERT MAISL, DROrr DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES tLtcOMMU-
NICATIONS No. 749 (1989).
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acquire information about the decompiled program's interfaces (or
indeed, to insert new interfaces into the original program), which will
in turn permit the user to create new programs exploiting those
interfaces.
The Directive strives to attain two potentially conflicting
objectives. On the one hand, the Directive seeks to encourage the
creation and production of software in general, by confirming the
place of computer programs in the copyright domain. On the other
hand, the Directive endeavors to foster the creativity and the financial
viability of smaller producers, by permitting them to uncover the
creative process underlying the major market programs, and thereby
to design substitutes for these programs. However, if one goal of the
Directive was to assist EC Member States' Davids in their competi-
tion with (often American) Goliaths in the informatics industry, the
Directive's text is neutral as to the commercial size of the user-
beneficiary. Hence, the Directive also enables Goliath to decompile
and compete with David's innovations. It therefore remains to be
seen whether the second goal may be achieved without compromising
the first.
